Introduction
Recently, central banks expanded the size of their balance sheets in an attempt to mitigate the …nancial turmoil that began in 2008. In order to accomplish this goal, various unconventional operations were implemented, such as a liquidity provision to households and businesses, bailouts to …nancial institutions and foreign exchange swaps with foreign central banks. All of the above-mentioned operations in ‡ated the central banks' balance sheets, and the magnitude of these operations was signi…cant. 1 These operations can be referred to as 'quasi…scal activities'because they do not conform to traditional monetary policy, which is used to stabilize in ‡ation by controlling the policy interest rate. 2 Instead of being innate to central banks, most of these activities can be implemented by …scal authorities. In this paper, a quasi-…scal policy is de…ned as any policy action that a¤ects the central banks' balance sheets, with the exception of the traditional monetary policy mentioned above. For example, since credit easing operations alter the composition of the central banks'asset accounts, they are considered quasi-…scal policies. If losses are incurred from the central banks'assets and the …scal authorities decide not to compensate the losses, then the …scal authorities'decision is also a quasi-…scal policy because it decreases the central banks'capital account. Although current quasi-…scal operations are signi…cant in size and assumed to be crucial for economic recovery, little economic theory is available to explain the possible macroeconomic consequences of these operations. Speci…cally, the e¤ect of quasi-…scal policies on in ‡ation needs to be explained because de ‡ation has been one of the main concerns of policymakers during the implementation of such policies. This paper proposes a simple dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model, which incorporates quasi-…scal policies in order to address the following questions: 1) Do quasi-…scal policies and the central banks' balance sheets a¤ect in ‡ation? and 2) Do the central banks'balance sheets have implications for policy interactions between the central banks and …scal authorities? Sargent and Wallace (1981) and Leeper (1991) connected monetary and …scal policy by showing that one policy may impose restrictions on the other policy, and that the two policies should interact in a coherent way in order to deliver a unique equilibrium. In this conventional approach to policy interaction, the budget constraints of the central banks and …scal authorities are consolidated into a single equation. In other words, conventional models 1 For example, the Federal Reserve System's asset account was $894 billion at the end of 2007, but increased to $2,266 billion at the end of 2008. 2 Mackenzie and Stella (1996) de…ned a quasi-…scal activity as "an operation or measure carried out by a central bank . . . with an e¤ect that can, in principle, be duplicated by budgetary measures . . . and that has or may have an impact on the …nancial operations of the central bank" (p. 17).
implicitly assume that the …scal authorities acknowledge the central banks' liabilities and assets as their own liabilities and assets, and that the central banks'losses are automatically compensated by the …scal authorities. Due to these assumptions, in conventional models, the budget constraint of the central banks does not impose restrictions on the equilibrium.
However, questions can be raised about this conventional assumption. Stella and Lönnberg (2008) surveyed 135 central banks and discovered that laws did not always guarantee the …s-cal authorities'responsibility for the central banks'liabilities, and that the …scal authorities are not always prompt in recapitalizing the central banks. Speci…cally, Section 4 shows that the Federal Reserve System may su¤er negative net pro…ts due to risky assets and that such losses may not be fully covered by the treasury. In this regard, this paper relaxes the conventional assumption by elaborating on the institutional details that state that the central banks' ‡ow budget constraint is separate from the …scal authorities' ‡ow budget constraint. In addition, this paper's public sector model includes the …scal authorities'transfer rule for recapitalizing the central banks, and the transfer rule is the key quasi-…scal policy in the benchmark model.
Furthermore, this paper departs from conventional models by assuming that the real values of the central banks'and …scal authorities'liabilities have …nite upper bounds, which are the expected present values of their future earnings. Due to this assumption, the peculiar equilibria, where the …scal authorities and central banks can run a Ponzi scheme on each other and the real value of the central banks'capital grows (or shrinks) in…nitely, are excluded from this paper. By utilizing this assumption and the institutional details of the ‡ow budget constraints, we show that the intertemporal equilibrium condition from the central banks' budget constraint (the central banks' net liability valuation formula) may restrict equilibrium in ‡ation in a certain policy regime. In other words, the model in this paper includes two intertemporal equilibrium conditions (from the public sector's ‡ow budget constraints) and three policy instruments (monetary, …scal and quasi-…scal), whereas one intertemporal equilibrium condition and two policy instruments (monetary and …scal) exist in the conventional model.
The main result of this paper shows that a new policy regime exists and that it delivers a unique stationary equilibrium path. In this new policy regime, while quasi-…scal policy is active, monetary and …scal policies are 'passive'. 3 The active quasi-…scal policy means that the …scal authorities do not stabilize the central banks'real capital and do not increase the fund transfer to the central banks when losses are incurred. In this case, the central banks' net liability valuation formula restricts the equilibrium in ‡ation. Since the other two policies are passively adjusted in order to satisfy the equilibrium conditions, in ‡ation is uniquely determined by the central banks'net liability valuation formula in this regime. The economic mechanism underlying the active quasi-…scal policy regime is the private agent's (household's) portfolio adjustment between the central bank's liability and consumption. Suppose that an unanticipated shock occurs to the central bank's earnings. Then, households expect that the real value of the central bank's net liability will deviate from the expected present value of the central bank's future earnings if the general price level does not change. However, the portfolio adjustment between the central bank's liability and the other nominal asset (the …scal authority's liability) cannot be utilized to restore the equilibrium since the values of the two assets are synchronized by a common price, the general price level. Therefore, households will try to adjust their portfolio between the central bank's liability and consumption. This mechanism is the driving force behind in ‡ation (or de ‡ation) induced by quasi-…scal shocks in the active quasi-…scal policy regime.
The benchmark model is extended by including explicit examples of quasi-…scal policy, such as a credit easing operation. In the …rst extension, the central bank holds long-term government bonds during the implementation of the exit strategy. That is, in response to economic recovery, the central bank may try to withdraw liquidity from the economy by increasing the short-term interest rate. In the active quasi-…scal policy regime, such de ‡ationary policy shock induces in ‡ation via the devaluation of the central bank's longterm bond holdings when the central bank's capital is negative.
The second extension analyzes issues of the credit easing operation by including the central bank's risky loan to the private agent in the model. The results show that the loss incurred by the risky asset induces de ‡ation when the central bank's capital is positive. In sum, the quasi-…scal shocks may induce unintended e¤ects on in ‡ation. Therefore, if policymakers are concerned about the perverse e¤ects of quasi-…scal shocks, then the …scal authority and central bank should coordinate to stabilize the central bank's capital in a systematic way.
A few studies have been completed that shed light on the e¤ects of concerns on the central banks'balance sheets. Jeanne and Svensson (2007) showed that if the central banks su¤er losses when their capital falls under a …xed level, then the central banks'commitment to escape from the liquidity trap is more credible. On the other hand, Sims (2003) showed that the central banks'balance sheet concerns might undermine the central banks'abilities to prevent in ‡ation. Berriel and Bhattarai (2009) showed that the optimal monetary policy is signi…cantly di¤erent when the central bank's budget constraint is separate from the …scal authorities'budget constraint. Speci…cally, as the central banks place higher e¤ective weight on in ‡ation in the loss function, the variation in in ‡ation decreases.
One of the di¤erences between this paper and previous literature on the central banks' balance sheets is that a new type of equilibrium exists even if the policy interest rate does not depend upon the status of the central banks'balance sheets. For example, in Jeanne and Svensson (2007) and Berriel and Bhattarai (2009) , the central banks'loss function includes a deviation of the central banks' real capital. In these cases, the central banks' monetary policy behavior may be restricted by the balance sheet concerns. However, the monetary policy behavior in this paper follows a simple Taylor rule. In other words, the central bank, in this paper, will not generate seigniorage in response to its balance sheet concerns.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we build the model for the rational-expectations general equilibrium in exact nonlinear forms. In Section 3, the equilibrium conditions are linearized around the deterministic steady state in order to derive analytic solutions. In addition, we explain the equilibrium in the active quasi-…scal policy regime in this section. In Section 4, the plausibility of the active quasi-…scal policy regime is discussed by utilizing the actual balance sheet status of the Federal Reserve System. The benchmark model is extended to include the exit strategy in Section 5 and issues in credit easing operations are explored in Section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper.
The model

Private agent' s optimizing behavior
This model is a closed economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with money in the utility function. Output is given by the exogenous endowment process fy t g 1 t=0 for simplicity. The representative agent solves the following problem:
P t ; c t ; M t 0; 8t 0;
where u( ) is the utility function for consumption, v( ) is the utility function for the real money balance, c t is the single consumption goods, t is the lump-sum tax, M t is the nominal money balance, the agent holds B A t units of the government's risk-free one-period nominal bonds, P t is the price level, E t [ ] is the expectation based on the information available in period t, i t is the risk-free net nominal interest rate and the initial level of …nancial wealth
1 is given exogenously. The …rst order condition yields the following Euler equations:
where u 0 ( ) and v 0 ( ) refers to the …rst order derivative of u( ) and v( ), m t is the real money balance (M t =P t ), X t;t+1 is the real pricing kernel (or the discount factor) between period t and t + 1 and R t is the risk-free gross nominal interest rate. Equation (2) governs the money demand of the agent and Equation (3) leads to the Fisher equation.
In order to ensure the existence of the agent's unique optimal choice, the transversality condition should be assumed. Speci…cally, the agent cannot borrow a greater amount than the …nite present value of her future income. This optimal condition is expressed in the following condition:
where w A t is the agent's real …nancial wealth at period t and X t;T T 1 Q s=t X s;s+1 . In the optimal path, the ‡ow and intertemporal budget constraint are satis…ed by equality and it can be shown that (1) and (4) lead to the transversality condition for the agent as follows:
If the limit term in Equation (5) is strictly positive, then the agent accumulates an additional …nancial asset and it rolls over permanently. Obviously, this scenario is not optimal for the agent because the agent sacri…ces her consumption without any compensation. On the other hand, if the limit term in Equation (5) is negative, then the agent is allowed to borrow an additional unit of debt and roll it over permanently. This scenario is ruled out by the No-Ponzi scheme assumption, which can be seen in Condition (4).
The market clearing conditions are imposed for the general equilibrium. Speci…cally, the goods market, the nominal money and the government bonds market should be cleared as follows:
where M s t is the nominal money supply, B s t is the government nominal bonds supply and B C t is the central bank's demand for the government nominal bonds. 4 Then, after imposing market clearing conditions, the Euler equations turn into the following equilibrium conditions under the standard assumptions on preferences:
where f ( ) refers to the inverse function of v 0 ( ). Equation (9) states that the supply of the real money balance should be equal to the agent's real money demand and Equation (10) is the Fisher equation. In order to completely de…ne the rational-expectations general equilibrium, the policy behavior of the …scal authority and the central bank should be speci…ed. Section 2.2 and 2.3 will explain the public sector model and the policy behavior.
Budgetary independence of central banks
This section introduces the budgetary independence of the central bank, which is a key di¤erence between this model and conventional models. While the policy independence of the central bank refers to the central bank's autonomy in deciding policy variables, such as the policy interest rate, budgetary independence implies that the central bank's ‡ow budget constraint and intertemporal equilibrium condition are separate from those of the …scal authority. That is, the concept of budgetary independence has two aspects. First, the central bank's balance sheet is isolated from the balance sheet of the …scal authority. Due to this aspect, the ‡ow budget constraint of the consolidated government in conventional models is divided into two equations: one for the central bank and one for the …scal authority. 4 Determination of B C t will be explained in the next section.
Second, a set of assumptions separates the uni…ed intertemporal equilibrium condition (IEC) from the consolidated government budget constraint into two IECs. One IEC is from the central bank's ‡ow budget constraint and equilibrium conditions and the other is from the …scal authority's budget constraint and equilibrium conditions. The …rst aspect of budgetary independence elaborates on the institutional details of the central bank's balance sheet; therefore, the …rst aspect re ‡ects a fact. The second aspect consists of assumptions on the agent's expectations in regard to the public institutions' liabilities. This set of assumptions, which I will refer to as 'the budgetary independence condition,' is a crucial requirement for the results of this paper. That is, the budgetary independence condition imposes an additional restriction on the equilibrium and is a main deviation from conventional models. This section also provides arguments that the budgetary independence condition is a valid requirement for the public sector model.
Separation of ‡ow budget constraint
The …rst aspect of budgetary independence is explained using the balance sheets of the public institutions. In Table 1 , the simpli…ed balance sheets of the public institutions and the agent are illustrated as a benchmark case. Note that Table 1 omits the central bank's various accounts such as risky loans to the …nancial sector, which are accrued by quasi…scal activities. Speci…cally, the benchmark central bank only has monetary liability and one-period risk-free government bonds as assets. The purpose of Table 1 is to show how the balance sheets of public institutions are separated in the benchmark case. Based upon these simple benchmark balance sheets, future extensions can accommodate accounts from quasi-…scal actions, such as liquidity provisions to the …nancial sector. 
This balance sheet is e¤ective at the end of the period t. If the balance sheet is measured at the beginning of period t, the capital of the …scal authority is R t 1 B t 1 , the central bank's capital is R t 1 B . The third column shows the consolidated public sector balance sheet, which is a balance sheet of the consolidated government in conventional models. This conventional balance sheet can be derived by adding the …scal authority's balance sheet to the central bank's balance sheet. 6 In the last column, the private agent's balance sheet is a mirror image of the consolidated public sector balance sheet. 
Capital
Capital
Public sector (A+B) Private agent Asset Liability Asset Liability
Capital Capital
In order to derive ‡ow budget constraints, the changes in the balance sheets are illustrated in Table 2 . Table 2 shows the income and expenditure of each entity during the period t ( ‡ow variables), whereas Table 1 is a snapshot of each entity's …nancial status at the end of period t (stock variables). The …scal surplus s t is the lump-sum tax t less the …scal 6 B C t is cancelled out when the two balance sheets are consolidated. authority expenditure in units of real goods, 7 and t refers to the transfer from the …scal authority to the central bank in the real goods unit. 8 According to Table 2 , the …scal authority receives nominal income from the lump-sum tax, then spends for the government expenditure, transfer to the central bank and interest payments. The nominal income of the central bank is the transfer from the …scal authority and interest earnings from the …scal authority bonds holding. Finally, the agent receives nominal income (P t y t + i t 1 B A t 1 ), then spends for consumption and pays the lump-sum tax.
Since ‡ow budget constraints show possible changes in the balance sheets, the constraints are derived by equating the changes in the asset account to the sum of the changes in the liability and capital accounts. From the (A+B) column in Table 2 , a consolidated government ‡ow budget constraint is derived as in Equation (11).
The central bank's ‡ow budget constraint is derived from the Figure 2 column (B) as in Equation (12), while the ‡ow budget constraint of the …scal authority as found in Equation (13) is derived from column (A).
Note that Equation (11) is a sum of Equations (12) and (13) . Since t is the transfer term between the two public institutions, it is cancelled out when the budget constraints are consolidated into Equation (11) . In addition, since the total …scal authority bonds B t are divided into the central bank's holding B 7 The government spending is assumed to be zero for all time periods. No result relies on this assumption. 8 Central banks generally submit their net pro…ts to …scal authorities. In this case, t is a negative number.
Separation of intertemporal equilibrium condition
For the second aspect of the central bank's budgetary independence, an extra set of conditions is assumed for the agent's expectations in regard to the two public institutions'relationship. This set of conditions, which is shown in Conditions (15) and (16), is required in order to separate the uni…ed IEC from the consolidated government budget constraint into two IECs. In the conventional models, such as are found in Woodford (2001) , the uni…ed IEC (government debt valuation formula) is as follows:
The uni…ed IEC (14) can be derived by solving forward the consolidated government budget constraint (11) , while the equilibrium conditions including the agent's transversality condition (5) are substituted into the constraint. The Proposition 1 states that the uni…ed IEC is separated into two IECs when the agent expects that the central bank and the …scal authority have bounded real values for their liabilities. (15) and (16) are true, w A t < 1 9 and P t , X t;T > 0 for all t and T > t,
Proposition 1 Suppose the Conditions
then the uni…ed IEC (14) is separated into two IECs.
refers to the real net liability of the central bank (the …scal authority) at period t and w
Intuitively, the Conditions (15) and (16) mean that the real values of the central bank and the …scal authority liabilities cannot be greater 9 Arguably, the real value of government liability (w A t ) is bounded. One can imagine equilibria where the lump-sum tax to output ratio is unbounded. In these equilibria, it may be possible that the government liability to output ratio as well as the lump-sum tax to output ratio are explosive, while the tax to debt ratio remains …nite. Canzoneri et al.'s (2001) results showed the Ricardian equivalence under these equilibria. However, if a distortionary tax is introduced, then the scenario is not feasible. This paper excludes these bizarre equilibria by assumption.
than the expected present value of the future earnings. Appendix A shows that the following two equations are equivalent to Conditions (15) and (16) .
Then, the ‡ow budget constraints (12) and (13) are turned into the following IECs by imposing equilibrium conditions ( (9) and (10)) and the budgetary independence condition ( (17) and (18)).
Note that Equation (14) is a sum of Equations (19) and (20). I refer to the IEC (19) as 'the central bank's net liability valuation formula' because Equation (19) indicates that the real value of the central bank's net liability is equal to the expected present value of the seigniorage (
) and the transfer earnings from (or payment to) the …scal authority (
. 10 The IEC (20) states that the real value of the …scal authority's total liability is supported by the current and future …scal surplus less the transfer to the central bank. It should also be noted that Equations (19) and (20) are not constraints, but are equilibrium conditions from the Euler equations, the agent's optimal conditions, the agent's expectations on the policy institutions and ‡ow budget constraints.
Remark 1
The crux of assumptions (15) and (16) is that the expected present value of the transfers between the two institutions is …nite.
In this model, the present values of the seigniorage and …scal surplus converge to …nite values. The convergence of the present value of the seigniorage revenue can be shown by the agent's intertemporal budget constraint, which is Inequality (21).
The right side of Inequality (21) is positive and bounded, which is implied by the agent's No-Ponzi scheme assumption (4) and the assumption w A t < 1. Since both consumption and the real balance holding are positive, then the present value of the seigniorage is …nite in any equilibrium. The present value of the …scal surplus (
should be also …nite in the IEC (14) . Since the terms other than the present value of transfer are all …nite in (15) and (16), the validity of assumptions (15) and (16) hinges on the convergence of the expected present value of the transfers.
A su¢ cient condition for the convergence of the transfer in the deterministic case is presented in Condition (22). Using the ratio test for the convergence of the in…nite series, we get
Condition (22) means that the transfer may grow faster than the real interest rate for only a …nite number of time periods. If the transfer grows faster than the real rate for an in…nite number of time periods, then the real values of the public institutions'liabilities will grow (or shrink) inde…nitely by the ‡ow budget constraints. In this case, the exploding transfer should ultimately be …nanced by the exploding B C since the convergence of the seigniorage and surplus implies that the asymptotic growth rates of the seigniorage and surplus will fall below the real interest rate. The conventional models, without the budgetary independence of the central banks, have not excluded this peculiar scenario. In this perspective, the additional set of assumptions (15) and (16) is a lax requirement for the public sector model because the exploding liabilities scenario is hardly imaginable. Indeed, it is observed that restrictions (15) and (16) have been in e¤ect, and that the restrictions become more plausible with the recent trend of the central banks'policy independence. 11 These two rationales are elaborated as follows. First, the value of the transfers between the governments and central banks (or banknote issuing commercial banks) have been limited in the history of central banking. In the early stage of the central banks'evolution, they were bestowed a charter to issue monetary liability in return for …nancial favors to the governments. Although the early central banks provided …nancial services to the governments, the governments usually did not support the early central banks when they were in distress. This feature was revealed by the public's distrust of banknotes in the face of …nancial crises (Goodhart, 1988, p. 19-20) . For example, the failure of the John Law's Banque Royale in France (1720) and the suspension of gold convertibility in England (1797-1819) showed that governments have refused (or been unable) to support the values of the central banks'liabilities. If the governments'transfers to the central banks have in…nite present values, then the government should have injected gold (or silver) into the central banks'vaults in order to ensure the convertibility of the banknotes. However, the exact opposite scenario has occurred in history. That is, the governments often suspended convertibility during times of …scal need. Also, during some occasions, such as during the …rst world war in Germany, the central banks transferred funds to the governments on a large scale, but such operations came to an end with the occurrence of hyperin ‡ation and regime changes.
Second, as more emphasis is placed on the central banks'policy independence, the budgetary independence assumptions (15) and (16) (or equivalently, (17) and (18)) have become more plausible. That is, Sims (2003) claimed that a trend has occurred to prohibit the compulsory accumulation of the …scal authority debts by the independent central bank, and that the transactions between the …scal authority and the independent central bank should be mere by-products of monetary policy. The intuition on conditions (17) and (18) conforms to the above statements. Speci…cally, (17) and (18) imply that neither the central bank nor the …scal authority can run a Ponzi scheme on the other entity. The Ponzi scheme scenario is obviously unacceptable to the central banks which have policy independence where acquisition of government debts only occur for monetary policy purposes. In other words, the policy independent central bank is expected to reject extreme paths of transfer which violate the condition (22) and the budgetary independence requirement. In sum, the budgetary independence is ubiquitous for the central banks and a sensible assumption because the concept is well applicable to both the early central banks as well as to the modern central banks which have policy independence.
Policy behavior
Although Equations (19) and (20) are equilibrium conditions, various policy mixtures can deliver the equilibrium price level P t . In conventional literature, generally, monetary policy determines the path of the policy interest rate, while …scal policy decides the path of the …scal surplus fs t g. A description of monetary and …scal policy behavior is su¢ cient for determining a unique equilibrium price level in conventional literature because the two terms su¢ ciently characterize the policy behaviors in (14) . However, in this paper, another policy rule must also be established in order to determine the equilibrium as there is an additional unspeci…ed policy variable f t g. This section proposes a rule for the …scal authority's transfer to the central bank f t g. The rule is referred to as quasi-…scal policy in the benchmark model.
Clari…cation on quasi-…scal policy
Before the policy rules can be speci…ed, we must clarify the concept of quasi-…scal policy, both in general and in particular for this model. The term quasi-…scal policy covers a wide range of policy behaviors. As it is already de…ned in the introduction, quasi-…scal policy refers to any action, except monetary policy, that a¤ects the central bank's balance sheet. Additional clari…cations can be made with respect to the following questions: 1) Which public institution decides quasi-…scal policy?, 2) What are the policy instruments? and 3) Why does this model focus on the transfer between the two institutions as a representative of quasi-…scal policy?
In regard to the authority in charge of quasi-…scal policy, both the …scal authority and the central bank may, in general, decide quasi-…scal policy. For example, if the central bank decides to provide liquidity to the …nancial sector, the policy may be the central bank's decision. However, as it has already been noted, the transfer from the …scal authority to the central bank is also quasi-…scal policy. If the …scal authority decides not to transfer funds to the central bank, then the …scal authority determines the quasi-…scal policy in this case.
Policy instruments can also vary based on speci…c cases. In order to provide liquidity to the …nancial sector, the central bank can purchase risky assets from the …nancial sector. In this case, quasi-…scal policy is implemented by adjusting the central bank's asset account. The sterilized foreign exchange rate intervention is another example in which the central bank's asset account (foreign reserve) is the policy instrument. When a quasi-…scal activity is aimed at recapitalizing the central bank, the transfer rule from the …scal authority to the central bank can be used as an instrument.
The benchmark model of this paper excludes all other quasi-…scal policies and focuses only on the transfer from the …scal authority to the central bank. This modeling choice is related to the notion of policies'activeness. Leeper (1991) stated that active policy is not constrained by the state of the economy. Speci…cally, in Leeper (1991) , …scal policy is active when the …scal authority pays little attention to the level of the real value of government debt when it determines the …scal policy instrument, the lump-sum tax. In other words, the level of government debt is one of the states of the economy in conventional models. In this paper, the state of the economy includes the level of government debt as well as the central bank's capital, which is obvious from the IEC (19) and (20). Then, the modeling choice is to determine which particular quasi-…scal policy is most appropriate with which to target the central bank's capital. Targeting the central bank's capital means that the …scal authority uses the quasi-…scal policy instrument in order to maintain a certain level of the central bank's capital. Therefore, if the …scal authority does not target the central bank's capital, then the quasi-…scal policy is active.
One of the most direct ways to target the central bank's capital is to transfer funds from the …scal authority to the central bank because the central banks do not impose direct taxes to the agent in general. Therefore, an appropriate way to model the central bank's capital targeting behavior is the transfer rule. This rule can be used because the other quasi-…scal policy actions, such as the liquidity provision, have other cardinal policy motivations. For instance, a key motivation of the liquidity provision is to stabilize the …nancial sector, and it is not generally used for adjusting the central bank's capital level. Although the benchmark model does not include various quasi-…scal policies, the framework will be extended to include explicit examples of quasi-…scal policies in Section 5 and 6.
Policy rules
Linear policy rules are introduced in order to specify the policy behaviors. First, monetary policy follows the simple Taylor rule. That is, the central bank sets the risk-free gross interest rate (policy interest rate) in response to contemporary in ‡ation as follows:
where 0 and are policy parameters, t refers to the monetary policy shock which follows the AR(1) process and " t is white noise. Note that the central bank does not adjust the policy interest rate in response to its capital level. In other words, the model central bank does not try to target its capital by printing money. Second, the …scal authority determines the transfer to the central bank ( t ) by following the next rule.
where 0 and Q are policy parameters, t is the AR(1) random policy shock, b
is the real capital of the central bank, cap is the central bank's real capital target and " t is white noise. The quasi-…scal policy rule (24) states that the transfer between the central bank and the …scal authority may or may not be responsive to the level of the central bank's real capital. When the central bank's real capital falls below the target level (cap), the …scal authority's transfer to the central bank increases if the parameter Q is strictly positive. If the parameter Q is zero, then the …scal authority does not adjust its transfer to the central bank in response to the level of the central bank's capital. The quasi-…scal policy shock t is the random part of the transfer.
Finally, the …scal authority determines …scal surplus s t by the rule (25). Given this rule, the …scal surplus may or may not be constrained by the level of the …scal authority's debt.
where 0 and F are the policy parameters, b A t is the real value of the …scal authority's debt which is held by the agent (B A t =P t ), t is an AR(1) …scal policy shock and " t is white noise.
Equilibrium
The rational-expectations general equilibrium is de…ned as the sequence of price {P t }, the sequences of policy variables {R t ,s t , t } and the sequences of allocations {c t ,M t ,M (9) and (10)), the market clearing conditions ((6), (7) and (8)), the public sector budget constraints ( (12) and (13)) and the policy rules ((23), (24) and (25)), given the exogenous processes {y t , t , t , t }. In addition, the optimal condition (5) and the budgetary independence condition ( (17) and (18)) are satis…ed in the equilibrium.
This paper focuses on the equilibrium in which the central bank's net liability valuation formula (19) uniquely determines the price level. Similar to Cochrane (2001)'s characterization of the …scal theory of the price level, the price level is determined by the ratio of the central bank's net liability to the present value of the central bank's future earnings in such equilibrium. The complete characterization of the policy regime in which such equilibrium realizes will be explored in Section 3 within the context of linearized system.
Linearized system
In this section, the equilibrium conditions are linearized around the deterministic steady state while the equilibrium conditions are expressed in exact nonlinear forms in Section 2. Speci…cally, this section's analysis is restricted to the equilibria with the bounded in ‡ation rate and real values of bonds (b A t and b C t ). 12 In addition, this section assumes the log utility function and a constant output for simplicity.
where is a parameter for the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and the real money balance. In this simple case, the equilibrium conditions from the private agent's behavior ( (9) and (10)) become the next two equations.
where the in ‡ation rate t+1 P t+1 =P t . Another notable simpli…cation from the log-utility and constant output assumption is that the seigniorage and real pricing kernel are constant for each period.
Policy interactions
The linear dynamic system is derived from the equilibrium conditions of the private agent's optimization ((27) and (28)), the policy rules ( (23), (24) and (25)) and the public sector's ‡ow budget constraints ( (12) and (13)), after they have been linearized. In order to apply Sims'(2001) algorithm, the system is summarized in a matrix form as follows. 12 If we restrict the analysis to the equilibria with the bounded in ‡ation, then the real values of bonds (b where the vector of the endogenous variables is x t (^ t ;b
0 , the vector of the exogenous shocks is z t (^ t ;^ t ;^ t ) 0 , the forecast error vector is t+1
, and are 3 3 parameter matrices, and the^notation is used for the linear deviation from the deterministic steady state.
Proposition 2 Three regions of policy parameter space (regimes) deliver a unique stationary solution of the system (31).
Proof. In order to uniquely determine the system's (31) solution, only one of eigenvalues of the transition matrix 1 0 1 should be greater than one in the absolute value because only one endogenous forecast error ( t+1 ) exists in the system. 13 The three eigenvalues are as follows:
That is, the existence and uniqueness of the solution depends upon the policy parameters ( ; Q and F ) and the deep behavioral parameter ( ). In addition, each policy parameter has one associated eigenvalue within the system. If an active policy is de…ned as the policy for which the associated eigenvalue is unstable, then it is obvious that only one of the three policies should be active in order for the system to have a unique solution. The three policy regimes that determine a unique stationary equilibrium path are as follows.
AMP regime: j j > 1;
The active monetary policy (AMP) and active …scal policy (AFP) regimes are well-known policy regimes. In the AMP regime, the monetary policy actively sets the policy interest rate in order to stabilize in ‡ation, while passive …scal policy supports the real value of the …scal authority's liability. In the AFP regime, the expected path of the …scal surplus determines in ‡ation, while the monetary policy passively accommodates the determined in ‡ation path by adjusting the nominal money balance. A novel …nding of this paper is the equilibrium in the active quasi-…scal policy (AQFP) regime and the requirements for the passive quasi…scal policy when other policies are active. In the AQFP regime, the active quasi-…scal policy determines in ‡ation and other policies are passive in the same way as in the other 13 The detailed derivation of the solution is described in Appendix B.
regimes. When the quasi-…scal policy is passive, then it tries to support the real value of the public sector liability.
A brief intuition of this policy interaction can be found in the following equilibrium conditions.
m Rb
where (32) 14 First, if monetary policy is active (j j > 1), then the expectational di¤erence equation (32) can be utilized to determine t . In this case, for the existence and uniqueness of the solution, the transfer f T g should support the real value of the central bank's liability (left side of IEC (33)) by being endogenously determined through the IEC (33). Meanwhile, the …scal surplus fs T g should be passively adjusted in order to support the real value of the …scal authority's liability in the IEC (34).
Second, active quasi-…scal policy ( 1 Q > 1) implies that the transfer f T g is not responsive to the state of the central bank's capital. Then, f T g can be regarded as an exogenous process in the IEC (33). Therefore, the IEC (33) imposes a restriction on in ‡ation since all variables other than in ‡ation are predetermined or exogenous. The passive monetary policy in Equation (32) (j j < 1) means that the expectational di¤erence equation (32) does not restrict in ‡ation t . Again, the passive …scal policy supports the real value of the …scal authority's liability so that the IEC (34) does not bind in ‡ation.
Third, when the …scal policy is active, the monetary and quasi-…scal policies should be passive. Speci…cally, Equation (32) should not impose an additional restriction on in ‡ation and the transfer f T g should be passive in a way that it is endogenously determined by the IECs (33) and (34), simultaneously. Since the endogenous process f T g appears in both the IECs, the two IECs jointly determine in ‡ation. In other words, the uni…ed IEC (14) is the single equation to be imposed on the in ‡ation process. Note that this equilibrium is the same as in the …scal theory of the price level.
Another notable feature of the policy interaction is that passive monetary policy does not need to raise the seigniorage revenue in order to cover the decreased transfer from the …scal authority or the decreased …scal authority surplus. The real seigniorage revenue is even a …xed number ( y) for all of the periods in this model. Even if the seigniorage is a function of the nominal interest rate under general circumstances, it is still the case that the nominal interest rate is not responsive to in ‡ation when monetary policy is passive. Therefore, in this case, the present value of the seigniorage in the IEC (33) can be treated as a …xed number. In sum, it is a misleading statement that passive monetary policy raises the seigniorage in order to balance the intertemporal budgets. Instead, the passive central bank adjusts the nominal money balance in order to accommodate the real money market clearing condition (9) in accordance with the equilibrium price level, which is determined elsewhere.
Equilibrium in the active quasi-…scal policy regime
As it is discussed in Proposition 2, if the quasi-…scal policy is active while the monetary and …scal policies are passive, then a unique stationary equilibrium in ‡ation path exists. The nature of this equilibrium is di¤erent from that of AMP and AFP regimes as the quasi-…scal policy shock a¤ects surprise in ‡ation and the direction of the e¤ect depends upon the steady state value of the central bank's capital. 15 For a simple illustration, the following special case is considered:
; Q ; ; ; = 0;
The central bank pegs the policy interest rate ( = 0), the …scal authority's transfer to the central bank is not responsive to the level of the central bank's capital ( Q = 0), the policy shocks are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) and the …scal authority su¢ ciently adjusts the lump-sum tax in response to the level of its own debt held by the agent. In this case, surprise in ‡ation is a function of the innovation in the quasi-…scal policy (shock in the transfer, " t ).
where R is the steady state value of the gross interest rate, b C is the steady state real value of the central bank's holding of the …scal authority bonds, m is the steady state value of the real money balance and Rb C m is the steady state value of the central bank's real capital. In ‡ation is the sum of the expected in ‡ation and surprise in ‡ation. Since the surprise in ‡ation was solved in Equation (36), then in ‡ation is determined as follows in the AQFP regime.^
Note that " t 1 is the expected in ‡ation E t 1 [^ t ] in this case. 16 The solution in Equation 
Private agent
Private agent
The economic mechanism through which quasi-…scal policy shocks a¤ect in ‡ation is explained using an analogy between this model and a private …rm's asset pricing case. In Figure 1 's Analogue case (A), the private agent holds liabilities from Firm C and Firm F. A cash ‡ow contract also exists between the …rms and, in return of the contract, one …rm holds the liability of the other …rm. Suppose that the cash ‡ow from Firm F to Firm C unexpectedly decreases. Then, the agent will try to adjust her portfolio by selling Firm C's liability and buying Firm F's liability since the shock is favorable to Firm F's value. The portfolio adjustment will continue until the real value of each …rm's liability becomes equal to the present value of each …rm's earnings. In the end, the relative price of Firm C's liability with respect to the price of Firm F's liability will fall.
The structure and procedure are similar in Figure 1 's Public Sector case (B). The private agent holds the liabilities from the central bank (M ) and the …scal authority (B A ), while an expected path of the cash transfer exists between the two public institutions ( ) and the central bank holds the …scal authority's liability (B C ). Suppose that a similar shock exists as in the analogy case. That is, a negative quasi-…scal policy shock decreases the transfer from the …scal authority to the central bank unexpectedly. Then, a portfolio adjustment will occur on the part of the private agent. However, fundamental di¤erences exist between the Public Sector and Analogue cases that make the Public Sector case special. That is, the public sector model determines in ‡ation, not asset prices. A crucial di¤erence between the cases is that the relative price of the central bank's liability with respect to the …scal authority's risk-free liability is …xed to one in the Public Sector case, while the prices of Firm C's and Firm F's liabilities are determined independently. That is, it is obvious from the representative agent's budget constraint (1) that one unit of B A t is guaranteed to be exchanged for one unit of M t . Since the values of the nominal money and government debts are synchronized, 17 it is useless to adjust the portfolio by exchanging
t when a quasi-…scal shock exists. Instead of exchanging M t with B A t , the agent has the option to choose consumption. When the agent feels that the the central bank's liability has changed, then she may try to adjust her consumption. This portfolio adjustment on the part of the agent is the driving force behind in ‡ation in the active quasi-…scal policy regime.
Another key characteristic of the portfolio adjustment is that the central bank's capital account (R t 1 B C t 1 M t 1 ) matters for the agent's portfolio determination. This feature also stems from the fact that the values of M , B
A and B C are synchronized in the public sector model. On the other hand, the agent would not be concerned with how much of Firm F's liability is held by Firm C when she assesses the impact of the shock on Firm C's value. The negative shock, which decreases the cash ‡ow to Firm C, is always unfavorable to Firm C's value. Although Firm C's asset value (the value of Firm F's liability within Firm C's asset account) re ‡ects the impact of the shock, the impact is exogenous to the agent's decision on Firm C's liability because the asset value is determined independently by the asset pricing equation for Firm F's liability.
In the public sector model, however, the impact of a similar shock on the central bank's value via the value of B
C cannot be exogenous to the agent's decision on the central bank's liability. As the price of B C is synchronized with the price of M , the portfolio adjustment for M will also a¤ect the value of B C through the common price 1=P t . Therefore, the agent takes the magnitude of both M and B C into account when she reacts to the shock. Speci…cally, the negative quasi-…scal shock is unfavorable to the value of M , but favorable to the value of B C . Thus, in an overall assessment, the negative quasi-…scal shock is favorable to the analytic solution to the system, which is found in Equation (36). When the transfer from the …scal authority to the central bank surprisingly decreases, the central bank's liability (M ) becomes more attractive to the agent, as discussed previously. Then, the agent tries to increase the nominal money holding by decreasing consumption. Since output is …xed in this endowment economy, the fall in demand causes de ‡ation. Meanwhile, the future lumpsum tax is expected to be passively adjusted in order to support the real value of the …scal authority's liability, so that the valuation formula for the …scal authority's liability (20) does not restrict the equilibrium in ‡ation.
A mechanical explanation as to what procedure the quasi-…scal shock induces in the AQFP regime is given as follows. The …rst step is the public sector's response to the quasi…scal shock. Suppose that the policy interest rate is pegged, no policy shocks exist other than the i.i.d. quasi-…scal shock during the current period, the lump-sum tax and the transfer are initially expected to remain at the steady state level, and the path of the price level is given parametrically to public institutions. For algebraic simplicity, the steady state in ‡ation is assumed to be zero (P t = P; 8t). Then, by the money market equilibrium condition (27), the nominal money balance is …xed at the steady state level for all time periods. Also, the laws of motion for B C and B A , which restrict the public sector's responses, are:
where R refers to the policy interest rate, which is pegged at the steady state level. Equations (38) and (39) are derived by simplifying the ‡ow budget constraints of the public institutions. Suppose further that the transfer t surprisingly decreases by one consumption good unit and that the price level is normalized to unity. Then, B C t also must be decreased by one consumption good unit. That is, the central bank sells one unit of the …scal authority's debts at the bonds market and submits the received cash to the …scal authority. In response to this shock, since the future transfers are expected to remain at the steady state level, it is expected that the central bank's holding of the …scal authority's debt will fall below of the steady state level as follows.
where B C is the steady state level of the central bank's holding of the …scal authority's debt. Then, in this case, the budgetary independence condition ( (17) and (18)) is violated as follows:
The second step of the procedure is the agent's reaction to the violation of the budgetary independence condition. The intuition of Equations (41) and (42) is that the …scal authority takes the central bank's real capital in one unit of real goods and does not eventually repay it. If the sales department takes the producing department's resource within the same …rm, then the news would not a¤ect the price of the …rm's stock. However, if Firm F takes Firm C's real capital, then the stock prices of the two …rms will be adjusted through the agent's portfolio adjustments. In the public sector model, the central bank and …scal authority are two distinct institutions, as they have distinct liabilities and the present value of the transfer between the institutions is …nite. Thus, the violation of conditions ( (17) and (18)) induces the agent's portfolio adjustment and the general price level P t can no longer be …xed. That is, through the portfolio adjustment, the price level is changed up to the point that the conditions ( (17) and (18)) are restored. Then, the future lump-sum tax will be changed according to the …scal policy rule.
Two more important features of the equilibrium exist. First, the model's economic mechanism for in ‡ation does not rely on the central bank's money creation in response to the transfer to the government. In the …rst step of the procedure, the central bank …xed the nominal money balance, but in ‡ation (de ‡ation) is still induced by the quasi-…scal shock. A similar statement can be made for the …scal theory of the price level. In the active …scal policy regime, the tax shock does not require the creation of money in order to have an impact on the price level. Otherwise, the tax shock induces the agent's portfolio adjustment, and, thus, the price changes. Therefore, this model's application is never restricted to extreme situations, such as a large scale transfer between two public institutions.
Second, the equilibrium in the AQFP regime is observationally equivalent to the equilibria in the AMP and AFP regimes. Suppose that a quasi-…scal policy shock causes in ‡ation in the AQFP regime. Then, the nominal money balance must be increased passively in order to clear the money market equilibrium condition (27) and the future …scal surplus must be passively decreased in accordance with the price change by the …scal policy rule (25). The required tax change in the present value can be shown by adding (19) to (20). This observational relationship between in ‡ation, the nominal money balance and the …scal surplus is the same as in the other regimes, although the causal relationships are opposite. For instance, in the AMP regime, an expansion of the nominal money balance (a negative monetary policy shock) causes in ‡ation and the …scal surplus is passively decreased. In the AFP regime, the decrease in the …scal surplus causes in ‡ation and the nominal money balance is passively increased.
4 Discussion: Plausibility of the AQFP regime
The active quasi-…scal policy regime becomes more plausible in major economies as the major central banks, such as the Federal Reserve System, are more involved in quasi-…scal activities. The crucial rationale for the activeness of quasi-…scal policy in the U.S. is the fact that the treasury does not guarantee full automatic compensation for losses incurred from the quasi-…scal activities of the Federal Reserve System. Suppose that the Federal Reserve System su¤ers losses from risky assets and the treasury does not automatically transfer funds to the system's capital account. Then, the transfer rule (24) implies that Q is su¢ ciently small and the quasi-…scal policy is arguably active.
The argument stems from the institutional feature that the funds transfer t is asymmetric between the cases where the Federal Reserve System has positive and negative pro…ts. As is usual for the central banks, the Federal Reserve System remits the positive net pro…t to the treasury on a regular basis, while maintaining a certain level of capital. This institutional feature may mislead the readers to argue that quasi-…scal policy should always be passive. However, in a contradictory case where the Federal Reserve System has a negative net pro…t, the remittance from the treasury to the Federal Reserve System is not guaranteed. 18 Instead, the system will suspend its transfer to the treasury until the system has a positive pro…t. 19 This case matches with the policy parameter Q = 0 in which the quasi-…scal policy is active. The Joint Statement by the Department of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve in March 2009 broadly stated that …scal policy should be responsible for the credit program and the system should avoid risks from policy operations. However, it is still true that the statement is silent about the treasury's practical responsibility in regard to the system's losses. The following numerical example illustrates a speci…c case in which the quasi-…scal policy becomes active. Table 3 shows the actual balance sheets of the Federal Reserve System before and after the …nancial turmoil in 2008. Notably, the Federal Reserve System funded various lending programs by increasing the reserve balances. While the magnitude of the security holdings increased, its maturity composition also changed signi…cantly. That is, only 48% of the total securities ($372 billion) had a long-term remaining maturity (longer than 1 year) in 2006, whereas 93% of the total securities ($1,477 billion) were long-term bonds in 2009.
The assets acquired from the lending programs bear risks. Stella (2009) projected possible losses of the Federal Reserve System by assuming various default rates. Utilizing Stella's (2009) calculations and assumptions, the Federal Reserve System may lose $59 billion from the emergency lending programs and $5 billion from the targeted lending programs. Even though the interest rate risks for the security holdings and interest payments for the excess reserves were not considered, the results indicate that the potential loss of the Federal Reserve System could be roughly $64 billion. If the Federal Reserve System's income falls below $64 billion during the period in which the system su¤ers losses, then the quasi-…scal policy becomes active. Since the system's average annual net income from 2003 to 2008 was $30 billion, 21 there is a non-trivial possibility that quasi-…scal policy could become active in the U.S. 20 Short term lending programs provide liquidity to …nancial institutions, which include discount window lendings, Term Auction Facility and etc. Targeted lending programs try to ease credit conditions in the commercial paper market as well as the credit market for households and small businesses. Emergency lending programs support speci…c …nancial institutions in distress, such as AIG and Bear Stearns. 21 The Average of the 'Net income prior to distribution' item at the Federal Reserve Banks Combined Financial Statements, Annual Report of Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (various years).
Application 1: Exit strategy
Exit strategy refers to plans to reverse unconventional quasi-…scal operations, such as credit easing operations, as economic recovery and in ‡ation become imminent. Speci…cally, the Federal Reserve System will be required to "reduce excess reserve balances" of depository institutions or "neutralize their potential e¤ects on broader measures of money and credit and thus, on aggregate demand and in ‡ation" (Bernanke, 2009c) . Roughly explained, the exit strategy is the plan to decrease the size of the central bank's balance sheet by selling the assets that have been acquired via unconventional operations.
This section analyzes the exit strategy's potential e¤ects on in ‡ation by extending the benchmark model to include the long-term bonds. Although the primary policy intent of the exit strategy is to avoid high in ‡ation due to large-scale excess liquidity in the economy, this paper explores a di¤erent aspect of the strategy. Suppose that the central bank increases the short-term policy interest rate during the implementation of the exit strategy. Since the central bank holds the long-term nominal bonds, an increase in the short-term rate may devaluate the central bank's long-term bond holdings. Then, through a portfolio adjustment of the private agent as seen in Section 3, the valuation loss of the central bank may a¤ect in ‡ation in the AQFP regime. The interesting feature of this mechanism is that an increase in the short-term rate (de ‡ationary policy) may lead to in ‡ation when the central bank's capital is negative.
In this extension, the long-term government nominal bonds are introduced. Speci…cally, B 1;t is the face value of one-period nominal bonds issued at t period and B 2;t refers to the face value of two-period nominal bonds issued at t period. The short-term bonds B 1;t mature at t + 1 period and are redeemed for the nominal money value R 1;t B 1;t at t + 1 period. The long-term bonds B 2;t mature at t + 2 period and are redeemed for the nominal money value R 2;t B 2;t at maturity. R 1;t and R 2;t are the gross nominal interest rates for the short-and long-term bonds, respectively. At t period, the representative agent sells the premature long-term bonds (B 2;t 1 ) and purchases the new long-term bonds (B 2;t ). The premature long-term bonds at period t (B 2;t 1 ) are claims for the nominal money value R 2;t 1 B 2;t 1 at t + 1 period. Instead of trading the premature long-term bonds, the private agent has the option to invest in the short-term bonds at t period. Since there should be no arbitrage opportunities, the two risk-free investment choices (premature long-term bonds and short-term bonds) should have the same return. Therefore, the market price of the premature long-term bonds at t period is R 2;t 1 R 1 1;t . For example, if a private agent invests R 2;t 1 R 1 1;t dollars when purchasing one contract of the premature long-term bonds at t period, then she will receive R 2;t 1 dollars at t + 1 period, since that is what the contract guarantees. In other words, the gross return of investment on the premature long-term bonds is R 1;t , which is equivalent to the return of the short-term bonds between periods t and t + 1.
By including the long-term bonds, the agent's optimization problem is revised as follows: (27), (28) 22 and the following additional equation:
The additional Euler equation (44) implies the expectations theory of the term structure of interest rates. In regard to the market clearing condition, the bonds market clearing condition is revised as follows, while the money and goods market clearing conditions remain the same as in the previous sections. The public sector model should also be extended. First, the central bank holds the longterm government bonds, while the …scal authority issues the long-term bonds. Parallel to the agent's case, the central bank sells the premature long-term bonds in the market and purchases the newly issued long-term bonds. Then, the ‡ow budget constraints of the central bank and the …scal authority are as follows: 
The quasi-…scal policy rule (24) and the …scal policy rule (25) should be revised with longterm bonds. The revised rules are:
Second, the …scal authority and central bank decide the maturity structure of their liabilities and assets. Cochrane (2001) showed that the maturity structure of the government nominal debt a¤ects the equilibrium price level sequence. In this model extension, the following maturity structure is suggested:
where is a policy parameter, " t is white noise and t stands for the AR(1) exogenous policy shock that a¤ects the central bank's asset maturity structure. In this speci…cation of the maturity structure, the …scal authority maintains a …xed ratio ( ) between the face values of the short-and long-term bonds. The central bank maintains the same ratio ( ) 24 for its assets in the steady state, while the bank's asset maturity structure deviates from the …xed ratio ( ) when the policy shock t exists. The aforementioned maturity policy is such that the central bank (the …scal authority) adjusts the short-and long-term assets (debts) that are outstanding at each time period. Conversely, in Cochrane's (2001) cases with the outstanding long-term bonds, it was assumed that trade and redemption of premature long-term bonds were not allowed. Since this model allows such transactions, the total face value of the outstanding assets is exposed to the valuation risk when the central bank adjusts its asset balances. That is, if the current shortterm interest rate (R 1;t ) increases, then the value of the premature long-term bonds decreases through the decreased market price (R 2;t 1 R 1 1;t ). This set-up is appropriate for analyzing issues of the exit strategy. When economic recovery and in ‡ation are imminent, the Federal Reserve System may try to withdraw liquidity from the economy by selling its assets. During that process, it is plausible that the Federal Reserve System will be required to sell premature long-term bonds because a signi…cant portion of the system's assets is contained within long-term bonds. Since the exit strategy increases the short-term interest rate, the valuation loss from trading the premature long-term bonds is relevant in the exit strategy.
By following the same steps as seen in Section 3, a linearized dynamic system is constructed for the vector of the endogenous variables (^ t ;b
0 . The detailed speci…cation of the system and solution are described in Appendix C. If the policy parameter is a special case of the AQFP regime as seen in Condition (35), then the surprise in ‡ation is
where b The results show that when the central bank's steady state capital level is negative ((1 + )R 1 b C 1 m < 0), then the positive monetary policy shock (" t > 0) induces in ‡ation ( t > 0) in the AQFP regime. The economic mechanism is similar to that seen in Section 3. That is, the positive monetary policy shock devaluates the central bank's asset accounts. Then, in the AQFP regime, the agent will try to hold less money (when the central bank's capital is negative) since the policy shock has a negative e¤ect on the value of the central bank's net liability. Therefore, the positive monetary policy shock induces surprise in ‡ation. However, this outcome may not be desirable to the central bank because a positive monetary policy shock is generally intended for mitigating in ‡ation. Jeanne and Svensson (2007) pointed out that the negative capital of the central bank may undermine the bank's independence from the …scal authority. However, it is also true that the central bank can still operate with negative capital. The results of this section show that negative capital may not be desirable to the central banks, but for a di¤erent reason. That is, a tightening monetary policy shock may ignite further in ‡ation when the capital is negative. This issue is relevant to the central banks with negative capital because the …scal authorities in such countries generally do not provide automatic …scal back-ups in order to target the central bank's capital, thus the quasi-…scal policy is arguably active.
Application 2: Credit easing
This section extends the benchmark model by including a credit easing operation. Credit easing is a policy strategy that attempts "to improve the functioning of credit markets and to increase the supply of credit to households and businesses" (Bernanke, 2009b) . The Federal Reserve System implemented credit easing operations by purchasing risky assets from private agents. Therefore, this section introduces a risky asset into the central bank's asset account. As a result, it will be shown that the loss incurred by the central bank's operations a¤ect in ‡ation in the AQFP regime.
In this extension of the model, the central bank makes a one-period loan (L t ) to the agent, which is equivalent to the supply of the credit to the households and businesses in a credit easing operation. That is, the agent receives money in the same amount as the loan L t at period t, then repays the loan in the next period with an interest payment. The gross interest rate for L t at period t + 1 is denoted as R L t+1 , which is unknown at period t. In other words, the return for the loan is a random variable and the loan is risky.
The additional …rst order condition for L t from the agent's optimization problem is as follows:
By assuming further that the nominal pricing kernel X t;t+1
and the gross return of the loan R L t+1 are uncorrelated, it is implied that
As a convenient speci…cation of R L t+1 that satis…es (55), I propose the following speci…cation
where " Lt is white noise and refers to the random part of the return. The random part of the return " Lt is an exogenous process that the central bank cannot control. In this case, " Lt represents a random shock that occurs to the central bank's earnings due to random ‡uctuations in asset prices that are uncorrelated to its policy. The central bank may …nance the loan either by printing money or by selling …scal authority bonds. If the loan is …nanced by issuing money, then the operation constitutes the monetary policy shock ( t ) since the policy interest rate should be decreased while the nominal money balance increases. In order to focus on the equilibrium in the AQFP regime and the e¤ect of the quasi-…scal policy shock, let's suppose that the central bank …xes the level of the nominal money balance and sells …scal authority bonds to …nance the loan. 25 Then, in this model, the credit easing operation alters the composition of the central bank's assets by exchanging the risk-free …scal authority debt with the risky loan to the agent. In regard to the agent's portfolio, the agent's asset (B A t ) and liability (L t ) increase simultaneously due to the operation. In sum, the agent borrows from the central bank and invests in the …scal authority debt while the …scal authority debt held by the central bank decreases.
In actual policy implementations, the liquidity provided by the central bank is to be used to ease the credit condition among private agents instead of being invested in the …scal authority debt. Since this paper is based on a representative agent model without …nancial frictions, the credit crunch issue is out of this paper's scope. Nevertheless, since the focus of this extension is on showing how the possible loss from the operation may a¤ect in ‡ation in a simple model, then the simpli…ed model is still valid for analysis. In addition, the modeling set-up is such that the credit easing operation is implemented by changing the central bank's asset composition. Bernanke (2009a) stated that "Federal Reserve's credit easing approach focuses on the mix of loans and securities that it holds and on how this composition of assets a¤ects credit conditions," whereas, in a quantitative easing operation "the composition of loans and securities ... is incidental."Therefore, the set-up re ‡ects the actual policy intention of the Federal Reserve System.
In order to focus on the possible e¤ects of losses incurred by the operation, policy decisions to adjust the level of the loan are also excluded from the model. That is, the central bank is assumed to maintain the constant level of the loan's real value. ( Lt Pt = l; 8t) In other words, the central bank does not have the policy freedom to adjust the level of the loan due to an exogenous policy consideration (easing the credit condition), which cannot be explicitly modeled in this extension. The real value of the loan can be modeled to follow an exogenous stochastic process such as the AR (1) process, but the main result will remain the same. Then, with a minor extension to Equation (12) , the central bank's budget constraint becomes the new accounting identity as follows.
Suppose further that the policy regime is the AQFP regime as in (35). Then, the surprise in ‡ation is a linear function of the transfer shock (" t ), as well as the random return of the loan (" Lt ). Note that, in this case, the term quasi-…scal shock includes a policy shock (" t ) and an exogenous shock (" Lt )
A notable conclusion to this extension is that the loss incurred by the credit easing operation (" Lt < 0) has a de ‡ationary e¤ect when the central bank's steady state real capital (Rb C + Rl m) is positive. The economic mechanism underlying this result is the agent's portfolio adjustment as explained in Section 3. That is, the surprise earning shock (negative) of the central bank makes the nominal money more valuable to the agent in an overall assessment. Thus, the agent attempts to hold more money. Note that the result is analogous to the …scal theory of the price level in the sense that a tax cut (or increase in a lump-sum transfer) induces in ‡ation 26 when the …scal policy is active.
The policy implication of the result is obvious. If policymakers are concerned with de ‡ation (or in ‡ation) and the quasi-…scal policy is active, then any loss incurred from the credit easing operation should be immediately compensated by the …scal authority as in (59)
The proposed policy (59) is actually guaranteed in the United Kingdom for the 'Asset Purchase Facility' of the Bank of England. 27 On the other hand, if the quasi-…scal policy is passive, then the transfer from the …scal authority to the central bank su¢ ciently reacts to the changes in the central bank's capital. In other words, in order to isolate the possible e¤ects of the quasi-…scal shocks on in ‡ation, the …scal authority's automatic and immediate funds transfer to the central bank is required regardless of whether the quasi-…scal policy is active or passive. Therefore, the …scal authority's role in o¤setting the shocks in the central 26 The steady state real capital of the consolidated government is generally negative ( Rb bank's capital is a prerequisite to price stabilization.
Traditionally, it has been argued that the quasi-…scal operations of the central bank may undermine monetary policy's credibility and independence. Focusing on this point, Goodfriend (1994 Goodfriend ( , 2009 claimed that an 'accord' between the two institutions is needed in order to ensure the central banks' independence. Although our reasoning is di¤erent, our analytic results support Goodfriend's (2009) suggestion. That is, this paper shows that the quasi-…scal shocks a¤ect in ‡ation when the …scal authority does not o¤set the shocks by targeting the central bank's capital. Therefore, policy coordination between the two institutions is indispensable for price stability.
Conclusion
Conventional macroeconomic models treat the central bank's balance sheet as super…cial information that does not a¤ect the equilibrium. However, this paper shows that quasi-…scal policies, which alter the central bank's balance sheet, a¤ect the equilibrium in ‡ation in a certain policy regime. In the active quasi-…scal policy regime, the transfer rule between the …scal authority and central bank does not automatically stabilize the central bank's real capital while monetary and …scal policies are passive. In this policy regime, the quasi…scal shocks, including the losses incurred from the credit easing operations, a¤ect in ‡ation via the private agent's portfolio adjustment. Previous studies, which have not considered this possibility, implicitly assume that the quasi-…scal policy is always passive. However, in general circumstances, the policy's passivity is not guaranteed. In other words, it can be an illusionary belief that the …scal authority will always automatically support the central bank's losses considering the actual laws on the central banks.
The crucial assumption needed for these results is the budgetary independence of the central banks. The budgetary independence of the central banks implies that the real value of central banks'net liability has a …nite upper bound, which is the present value of seigniorage and transfer earnings. This paper also shows that the condition is satis…ed under general circumstances. When the budgetary independence condition is satis…ed, an additional equilibrium condition exists, which is referred to as the central bank's net liability valuation formula, and the formula may or may not restrict in ‡ation process depending on the activeness of quasi-…scal policy.
The economic mechanism underlying the equilibrium in the active quasi-…scal policy regime is the private agent's response to the quasi-…scal shocks. When a shock occurs to the central bank's earnings in this policy regime, the agent tries to adjust her portfolio between the central bank's liability and consumption, thus the shock a¤ects in ‡ation. This mechanism is comparable to the asset pricing relationships, which equate the value of an asset with the present value of the asset's current and future earnings. That is, the central bank's net liability valuation formula is an asset pricing equation where the general price level is the price of the bank's liability with respect to consumption.
By extending the benchmark model, this paper shows that the issues of an exit strategy and a credit easing operation may a¤ect in ‡ation in undesirable ways. If the policy regime is active quasi-…scal policy during the implementation of the exit strategy, then the monetary policy shock may a¤ect in ‡ation through the central bank's net liability valuation formula. Notably, the contractionary monetary policy shock induces in ‡ation when the central bank's capital is negative. If the central bank su¤ers losses from the credit easing operation in the active quasi-…scal policy regime, then the loss induces de ‡ation. Therefore, the …scal authority and central bank should coordinate, by stabilizing the central bank's capital, in order to isolate the perverse e¤ects of quasi-…scal shocks on in ‡ation.
Appendix A. Part of the proof for Proposition 1
Conditions (15) and (16) imply that Conditions (17) and (18) hold. By summing the ‡ow budget constraints (12) and (13) over the period from t to T 1 after taking the discounted expected value (at period t) of the constraints, the following equations are true for all T t + 1. 
Equations (A3)-(A6) imply
1 < lim
since w 
Conversely, Conditions (A10) and (A11) imply that assumptions (15) and (16) hold. Suppose that Conditions (A10) and (A11) are true. From the budget constraints, Equations (A1) and (A2) are true. As T ! 1 in Equations (A1) and (A2), Conditions (A3) and (A4) hold by equality. Then, since d 
:
The solution of the system is derived by eliminating the explosive eigenvalues. If the j'th eigenvalue is explosive, then the solution is such that P j Y t = 0 where P j refers to the j'th row of P 1 . The linear mappings from the exogenous shock to the endogenous forecast error are given by P j C t = 0.
Appendix C. Solution of the dynamic system in Section 5
where ' By stacking the vectors x t and z t , the system (A15) becomes Equation (A16).
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Then, the transition matrix A is decomposed into P P 
:
When j'th eigenvalue is explosive, the linear mappings from the exogenous shocks to the endogenous forecast error are given by P j C t = 0 where P j refers to the j'th row of P 1 .
